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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we hold that when a convicted defendant 
dies after filing an appropriate appeal but before it is 
adjudicated, the conviction is abated and the indictment 
will be dismissed. If restitution has been directed, however, 
that order will not abate and the personal representative of 
the deceased defendant may prosecute the appeal on that 
phase of the case. 
 
Defendant Christopher was convicted after a jury trial on 
counts of mail fraud, false statements to the Social Security 
Administration, theft of cable services, and trafficking in 
counterfeit devices. The District Court imposed a sentence 
of forty-one months incarceration and three years of 
supervised release. The Court also ordered defendant to 
pay $17,010 in restitution to the Social Security 
Administration. 
 
Defendant filed a timely appeal, but died in prison while 
the appeal was pending. His widow was appointed as 
decedent's personal representative and was substituted as 
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appellant pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
43(a)(1).1 
 
Appellant contends that the conviction and the order of 
restitution should be abated because of defendant's death. 
The government responds that the appeal should be 
dismissed or, in the alternative, that even if the conviction 
is abated, the order of restitution should remain in effect 
absent a showing of invalidity. 
 
Although this Court has not previously addressed the 
proper disposition of an appeal by a deceased criminal 
defendant, the matter is not a new one. The issue arises 
most frequently in the state courts, although it has also 
been the subject of a number of opinions in the federal 
system. 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States encountered the 
issue a number of times in its early history. See, e.g., List 
v. Pennsylvania, 131 U.S. 396 (1888). Rather than catalog 
those cases, however, we think it appropriate to begin in 
more modern times with Durham v. United States , 401 U.S. 
481 (1971). 
 
In Durham, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
had affirmed the defendant's conviction, and the petition for 
certiorari had been filed before the defendant died.  401 
U.S. at 481. The Supreme Court granted the petition for 
certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
and remanded the case to the District Court with directions 
to dismiss the indictment. Id. at 483. The Supreme Court 
observed that "[i]n federal criminal cases[it had] developed 
the practice of dismissing the writ of certiorari and 
remanding the cause to the court below." Id . at 482. 
Basically, the Court allowed the scope of abatement to be 
determined by the lower federal courts. 
 
A few years later, the Court dismissed a petition for 
certiorari in a factually identical situation. See Dove v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Government argued that this matter was moot and that the 
deceased defendant's attorney did not have the authority to pursue the 
appeal. However, following the Court's suggestions, Mrs. Christopher 
was properly appointed administratrix so that she could proceed with 
the appeal. 
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United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976). The Court explained 
that "[t]o the extent that Durham . .. may be inconsistent 
with this ruling, Durham is overruled." Id. at 325; see also 
Kelly v. Matusiak, 479 U.S. 805 (1986) (petition for 
certiorari dismissed); Mintzes v. Buchanon, 471 U.S. 154 
(1985) (order granting certiorari vacated, petition for 
certiorari dismissed); Warden, Green Haven State Prison v. 
Palermo, 431 U.S. 911 (1977) (petition for certiorari 
dismissed). 
 
In most criminal cases, proceedings in the Supreme 
Court differ from those in the Courts of Appeals in one 
fundamental respect: appeals to the Courts of Appeals are 
of right, but writs of certiorari are granted at the discretion 
of the Supreme Court. The prevailing practice of the 
Supreme Court to dismiss petitions for certiorari upon the 
death of the convicted defendant, therefore, does not readily 
transfer to the Courts of Appeals. 
 
Faced with circumstances similar to those presented 
here, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while 
acknowledging Durham and Dove, concluded that when 
"death has deprived the accused of his right" to review by 
a Court of Appeals, "the interests of justice ordinarily 
require that he not stand convicted without resolution of 
the merits of his appeal, which is an integral part of [our] 
system for finally adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence." 
United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 
1977) (internal quotations omitted). The Court concluded 
that the appeal was moot, vacated the conviction, and 
remanded the case to the District Court to dismiss the 
indictment. Id. 
 
Other courts have reached the same result. See United 
States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1998) (interests 
of justice require that conviction not stand without 
resolution of the merits of an appeal); United States v. 
Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1346 (7th Cir. 1997) (abating 
conviction of defendant who died before the Court was able 
to decide his appeal on the merits and remanding with 
instructions to vacate conviction and dismiss indictment); 
United States v. Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 
1997) (criminal conviction not final until resolution of 
defendant's appeal as a matter of right); United States v. 
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Pogue, 19 F.3d 663, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing cases 
holding the same from the Courts of Appeals for the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits). 
 
Thus, the rule followed almost unanimously by the 
Courts of Appeals is that a conviction abates on the death 
of the accused before his appeal has been decided. The one 
case that has been cited as an exception is United States v. 
Dwyer, 855 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1988), but that view is based 
on an erroneous reading of that opinion. 
 
In Dwyer, the defendant committed suicide after the 
entry of the jury's guilty verdict. 855 F.2d at 145. The 
sentence had not yet been imposed, nor had an appeal 
been filed when the defendant's attorneys moved to abate 
the conviction. Id. The District Court denied the motion, 
and that order was appealed to our Court. Id. We held that 
the attorneys lacked authority to act for the defendant after 
his death and, therefore, had no standing to move for 
abatement. Id. (citing In re Chin, 848 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 
1988) (per curiam)). Moreover, because no judgment of 
sentence -- and thus no final order -- had been entered, 
this Court may have lacked appellate jurisdiction.  The 
concurring opinion, however, would have treated the case 
as moot. Id. at 145-46 (Sloviter, J., concurring). 
 
Dwyer is, therefore, clearly distinguishable from a 
situation in which the defendant dies after appealing the 
entry of a judgment of sentence. That case does not govern 
disposition of the appeal presently before us. 
 
We can discern no reason for this Court to deviate from 
the practice adopted by each of the other Courts of Appeals. 
The rule of abatement is well established, and we adopt it 
as the law in this Court. Thus, where a convicted criminal 
defendant dies after filing an appropriate appeal, the 
conviction will be abated and the case remanded to the 
District Court with instructions to dismiss the indictment. 
 
Forfeitures and fines are subject to abatement. Dwyer, 
855 F.2d at 146 (Sloviter, J., concurring); United States v. 
Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 176 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Oberlin, 718 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1983). But see Zizzo, 
120 F.3d at 1346-47 (explaining that the rule of abatement 
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has never been applied to require the return of money paid 
for fines before the defendant's death). 
 
The proper disposition of a restitution order, however, 
has divided the Courts of Appeals. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has 
reasoned that once a conviction is abated, a restitution 
order cannot survive. See Logal, 106 F.3d at 1552. "Under 
the doctrine of abatement ab initio, . . . the defendant 
stands as if he never had been indicted or convicted. The 
absence of a conviction precludes imposition of the 
restitution order . . . ." Id. (internal quotations & citations 
omitted). Although this reasoning cannot lightly be 
dismissed, the result it commands represents a minority 
view. 
 
In United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 1997), 
the Court concluded that when the restitution order is 
designed to make the victim whole, it is compensatory and 
survives the defendant's death. 106 F.3d at 93. In such 
circumstances, "only the portion of the proceedings 
unrelated to the restitution order is abated." Id. 
Consequently, although the Court abated the portion of the 
proceeding unrelated to the restitution order, the decedent's 
heirs were allowed to pursue the appeal because the 
restitution order survived. Id. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit has held similarly, excepting a restitution 
order from abatement, but reviewing the challenges to the 
conviction. See Dudley, 739 F.2d at 176-178. 
 
Two courts have concluded that the restitution order was 
moot because the decedent left no assets and any attempt 
at recovery would be futile. See Wright, 160 F.3d at 909; 
Pogue, 19 F.3d at 665. Neither court offered an observation 
on abating the restitution order. 
 
The question whether an order of restitution should 
abate depends essentially on its categorization as penal or 
compensatory. A penal provision, such as a fine or 
forfeiture, abates with the conviction. If viewed as 
compensatory, a restitution order survives. 
 
The issue may emerge in a variety of circumstances. The 
Supreme Court has noted that the Bankruptcy Code was 
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not intended to grant a discharge from criminal fines and 
penalties and held that, being criminal in nature, a 
restitution order was not subject to discharge. Kelly v. 
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 46-49 (1986). Although restitution 
is designed for the benefit of the victim, he has no control 
over the amount to be awarded, nor whether it will be 
directed. Id. at 52. We followed Kelly  in another bankruptcy 
discharge case. In re Rashid, 210 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Kelly, however, was not an abatement case. See United 
States v. Asset, 990 F.2d 208, 213 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993). In 
another context, the Supreme Court cited the goal of the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act as compensating victims 
of crimes. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 420 
(1990) (overruled on other grounds). 
 
We have held that the purpose of restitution under the 
Mandatory Victim Reparation Act is to compensate victims 
for their losses and to make them whole. United States v. 
Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2001); see also United 
States v. Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 2001) (fine is 
a form of punishment, whereas restitution is merely 
intended to compensate victims); Gov't of the Virgin Islands 
v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41, 47 (3d Cir. 1994) (restitution is 
compensatory rather than punitive); United States v. Kress, 
944 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1991) (restitution differs from 
fine or penalty and is intended to compensate victims). 
 
On the other hand, in United States v. Edwards , 162 
F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998), we concluded that for ex post facto 
purposes, restitution under the Mandatory Victim 
Restitution Act is a form of penalty. 162 F.3d at 91-92; see 
also United States v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012, 1020-21 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (prohibiting prejudgment interest because 
purpose of restitution under Probation Act is to make 
victim whole; order is imposed as part of sentencing 
process and remains inherently a criminal penalty). The 
application of the ex post facto clause to restitution orders 
has divided the Courts of Appeals.2  See United States v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit, which excepts restitution from 
abatement, has also held that restitution orders are subject to ex post 
facto consideration. See United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 
2000). 
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3. We are aware that 42 U.S.C. S 404(a)(2)B-C may possibly afford relief 
to the Commissioner of Social Security. See Heins v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 
157 (7th Cir. 1994). Because no facts have been presented to us, 
however, we express no opinion on that possibility. 
Schulte, 264 F.3d 656, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2001) (collecting 
cases). 
 
A survey of case law illustrates that restitution is best 
classified as compensatory, punitive, or a combination of 
both according to the context in which the issue arises. Our 
Court has not yet addressed this question in the abatement 
setting. Furthermore, our opinion in Edwards is not in 
conflict with our consideration of the abatement effect on 
restitution orders. 
 
We conclude that the order of restitution in this case is 
more compensatory in nature than penal. Historically, 
restitution, an equitable remedy, was intended to reimburse 
a person wronged by the actions of another. To absolve the 
estate from refunding the fruits of the wrongdoing would 
grant an undeserved windfall. We are persuaded that 
abatement should not apply to the order of restitution in 
this case, and thus, it survives against the estate of the 
deceased convict.3 
 
We will, therefore, grant the appellant's motion to abate 
the conviction, and direct the appellant to file a brief within 
thirty (30) days of the date of this Order addressing the 
merits of the restitution order. The Government may also 
file a responsive brief within (15) days of thereafter. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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